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10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
11 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
12 REGION 21

13 In the Matter of:) Case Nos. 21-CA-39546
14)
15 DIRECTV U.S.; DIRECTV HOLDINGS, LLC,) **BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF CROSS**
16) **EXCEPTIONS TO DECISION OF**
17 Employer/Respondent) **ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE**
18 and)
19)
20 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF)
21 MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS,)
22 DISTRICT LODGE 947, AFL-CIO.)
23)
24 Charging Party)
25)
26)
27)
28)

1 I. INTRODUCTION

2 This brief is submitted in support of the Cross Exceptions of the Charging Party.
3 Charging Party Joins in the Brief in Support of the Exceptions filed by the Acting General
4 Counsel and in those Exceptions.

5 II.

6 III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE INCORRECTLY FOUND THAT GREG
7 EDMONDS LOST THE PROTECTION OF THE ACT.

8 In this case, the ALJ found that employees at the Riverside facility of Respondents
9 DIRECTV U.S. and DIRECTV HOLDINGS, LLC (hereinafter, collectively “Respondent” or
10 “Employer”) regularly complained about having to wait in line each morning to be issued the

1 satellite television equipment need for the day's installations. (ALJ Decision, p. 7:30-34.) On
2 July 21, 2010, while waiting among the other installers to get his materials, Edmonds said to the
3 Operations Manager Freddy Zambrano (hereinafter, "Zambrano"), who happened to be walking
4 by, "Freddy, can't you do something about this fucking line? I stand in this fucking line ten hours
5 a day." (ALJ Decision, p. 8:14-15.)

6 When an employee is discharged purportedly for using obscene language to complain
7 about working conditions, as did Edmonds in this case, the employee's conduct must be analyzed
8 further to determine whether the employee's use of profanity caused the employee to lose the
9 National Labor Relations Act's (hereinafter, the "Act") protection. *Atlantic Steel*, 245 NLRB 814
10 (1979). In *Atlantic Steel*, the Board identified four factors for evaluating whether employees have
11 crossed the line: (1) the place of the discussion; (2) the subject matter of the discussion; (3) the
12 nature of the employee's outburst; and, (4) whether the outburst was, in any way, provoked by the
13 employer's unfair labor practice.

14 In this case, the ALJ applied the *Atlantic Steel* factors, but incorrectly determined that
15 Edmonds' remarks removed him from the protection of the Act. (ALJ Decision, p. 13:15-20.)
16 Specifically, the ALJ found that Edmonds' comments took place in a workplace setting in the
17 presence of 40 or 50 employees, who likely overheard his comments. (*Id.* at p. 13:8-9.) The ALJ
18 further found that the subject matter of the comments was clearly a "longstanding matter of
19 legitimate concern to all employees." (*Id.* at p. 13:9-10.) Finally, the ALJ concluded that
20 Edmonds' comments, taken in the relevant context, "would tend to diminish Zambrano's status
21 and authority in the eyes of other employees and have a deleterious effect on his 'right to
22 maintain order and respect in the workplace,' and finally, Edmonds' outburst was not provoked in
23 any way by Zambrano." (*Id.* at p. 13:15-18.)

24 The ALJ erred in his conclusion that Edmonds' comments fell outside the protection of
25 the Act, because Edmonds' comments were well within the protection of the Act, under the
26 analysis set forth in *Atlantic Steel*. First, while Edmonds' comments were made in a work area in
27 the presence of other employees, the comments had no potential for disrupting production, since
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1 the employees' actual work is performed at jobsites, not the warehouse where Edmonds' uttered
2 his remarks. As such, the location of Edmonds' comments weighs in favor of protection.

3 Second, since Edmonds' comments related to a term or condition of employment, the
4 subject matter of his comments favors of protection. In *CKS Tool & Engineering*, 332 NLRB
5 1578 (2003), the Board agreed with an administrative law judge's conclusion that an employee's
6 outburst at a meeting about employees productivity was protected. As such, because Edmonds'
7 statements to Zambrano involved working conditions, this factor favors finding his comments
8 protected. Edmond's comments were concerted activity because he and others had regularly
9 complained about the long wait. And since employees were paid in part on a piece rate system
10 this affected their earnings.

11 Third, the nature of Edmonds' comments, even though they included profanity, did not
12 disqualify them from protection under the Act. The employee's right to engage in concerted
13 activity must permit some leeway for impulsive behavior especially when the intemperate
14 language is part of the *res gestae* of the concerted activity. *Thor Power Tool Co.*, 351 F.2d 584
15 (7th Cir. 1965). In evaluating the nature of the employee's outburst, the Board looks at whether
16 the profanity was brief or prolonged, and whether it was accompanied by insubordination,
17 physical contact or a threat of physical harm. *Beverly Rehabilitation Services, Inc.*, 346 NLRB
18 1319, 1322-1323 (2006). The Board also considers whether the language used far exceeded that
19 which was common and tolerated in the workplace. *Aluminum Company of America*, 338 NLRB
20 20, 22 (2002).

21 Because Edmonds' remarks were brief, amounting to no more than a few sentences, and
22 were unaccompanied by insubordination, physical contact or threatened physical contact, this
23 factor favors protection.

24 Finally and we believe most potently, the use of profanity was common in Respondent's
25 warehouse. (See Tr. 35-38, 169-180, 234-235, 238, 240, 339-344.). The ALJ found that that
26 "[s]uch or similar language was not unusual." ALD Decision p. 3:25. Furthermore the employer
27 regularly condoned the use of such profanity. Once again this was found by the ALJ: "At no time
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1 were employees told by supervisor Wilson to watch their language and sometimes Wilson also
2 used such language.” Edmonds had regularly used profanity before even with Zambrano and had
3 never been warned or disciplined, ALJD p. 3: 11-8. The failure to warn or discipline Edmonds
4 before surely creates a culture of profanity in the workplace which surely condones such conduct
5 including Edmonds statement about the long wait in line. Surely then if such language was used
6 and condoned, Mr. Edmonds’ use of it is protected. Or at least it is discriminatory to fire him for
7 use of profanity when supervisors have used profanity.

8 Edmonds’ comments did not amount to insubordination, because they did not challenge
9 the employer’s authority to run the workplace by refusing to engage in production or perform a
10 work assignment or otherwise serve to directly challenge Respondent’s authority. See *Media*
11 *General Operations, Inc.*, 351 NLRB 1324, 1326 (2007). Furthermore, Zambrano’s response to
12 Edmonds’ remarks shows that Zambrano did not perceive that his ability to control the workplace
13 was affected by remarks. Specifically, the ALJ found that after Edmonds complained, Zambrano
14 approached him and spread his arms as if to block everyone and said, “Oh Greg. Nobody cut in
15 front of Greg. Okay?” (ALJ Decision, p. 8:16.) If Zambrano had felt that his authority had been
16 threatened, presumably he would not have made a joke about Edmonds’ comments and then
17 walked away, as he did. Thus Zambrano effectively condoned Edmond’s statement because he
18 made light of it and took no action. Thus, the nature of Edmonds’ comments supports a finding
19 that the comments were protected under the Act.

20 Finally, with respect to the last *Atlantic Steel* factor, the employer’s conduct was in the
21 context of unfair labor practices. The employer maintained unlawful rules in its handbook.
22 Moreover the employer had made it clear to employees in the nearby Rancho Dominguez facility
23 that it would not respect their choice to be represented by a Union.

24 The Board had conducted an election encompassing those workers on April 16, 2010
25 which Machinists District Lodge 947 had won but which had been set aside by a hearing office
26 based on objections filed by the employer. The hearing officer’s report was pending on
27 exceptions. On December 22, 2011 the Board issued a decision reversing the hearing officer and
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1 issuing a certification to the Union. See 357 NLRB No. 149 (2011). See footnote 5 of the ALJ
2 Decision. The employer had refused to bargain over any issue. Region 21 has now issued
3 complaint because Directv has refused to bargain and the motion for summary judgment is now
4 pending before the Board. See Case 21-CA-071591

5 Since the employer did commit an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain in the
6 nearby Rancho Dominguez unit Edmonds and other workers had no other way to approach the
7 employer and resolve this important workplace problem. This factor now weighs in favor of
8 finding the activity protected. DIRECTV is a lawbreaker. It has violated the Act by refusing to
9 bargain. It cannot justify its termination of Mr. Edmonds' complaint about working conditions
10 when it refuses to deal with the Union.

11 Here the employer had a culture of profanity. Although the ALJ properly found that the
12 termination of Mr. Edmonds violated section 8(a)(3), the termination also violates section 8(a)(1).
13 The evidence presented at the hearing in this matter established that Edmonds' profanity did not
14 cause him to lose the Act's protection, under the *Atlantic Steel* analysis.

15 **IV. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE SHOULD HAVE ORDERED**
16 **RESCISSION OF THE UNLAWFUL RULES**

17 The Charging Party excepts to the ALJ's failure to order rescission of Respondent's rules
18 that are found to be unlawfully restrictive of employees' ability to engage in protected concerted
19 activity.

20 The ALJ concluded that Respondent's handbook provisions, 3.4 Communications
21 Representing DIRECTV and 4.3.1 Confidentiality, were "unlawful on their face, as they would
22 reasonably tend to inhibit union or protected concerted activity by precluding employees from
23 discussing wages, hours, and working conditions with employees and others, including union
24 representatives, by precluding employees from contacting or conferring with representatives of
25 the media, and by causing employees to be reluctant to contact the Board or deal with Board
26 agents." (ALJ Decision, pp. 18:50-19:4, citing *Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin*, 330 NLRB 287
27 (1999); *Lafayette Park Hotel*, 326 NLRB 824 (1998).) The ALJ further found that Respondent's
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1 Policy document provisions entitled Employees and Public Relations were “unlawful on their
2 face as they would reasonably tend to inhibit union or protected activity by precluding employees
3 from discussing wages, hours, and working conditions with employees and others, including
4 union representatives, through the internet and by other means, and by precluding employees
5 from contacting or conferring with representatives of the media. (ALJ Decision, p. 19:6-10.)

6 While the Charging Party agrees with the ALJ’s conclusions concerning the unlawfulness
7 of Respondent’s rules, the Charging Party excepts to the remedy imposed by the ALJ.
8 Specifically, the ALJ rejected the normal remedy that the unlawful rules “should be entirely
9 expunged from the relevant documents.” (ALJ Decision, p. 19:18-19.) The ALJ reasoned that to
10 “[r]equire the Respondent to expunge the relevant provisions may unduly interfere with
11 legitimate employer prerogatives” and that “[Respondent] has attempted in good faith to resolve
12 this matter through its various postings.” (ALJ Decision, p. 19:21-23.) The furthest the ALJ
13 went was to order the parties “to explore modifications of the language or other alternatives
14 during the compliance stage of this proceeding.” (ALJ Decision, p. 19:23-24.) The ALJ’s
15 remedial conclusions are inadequate, insofar as the only appropriate remedy is complete
16 rescission of the unlawful rules.

17 As the ALJ acknowledged, Respondent is a national employer with national rules (ALJ
18 Decision, p. 19:19), and, as such, the rules found to be unlawful must be rescinded on a
19 nationwide basis. There is no showing in the record that suggests that these rules are valid in any
20 location over another, such that they must be ordered completely removed from publication in all
21 locations. Rescission of unlawful work rules should be ordered on the level that the unlawful
22 rules were publicized in the first place. See *Fredricksburg Glass and Mirror Inc.*, 323 NLRB 165
23 (1997); *Ark Las Vegas Restaurant Corp.*, 335 NLRB 1284 (2001), *Fresh & Easy Neighborhood*
24 *Market*, 356 NLRB No 85 (2011)(notice physically posted in Las Vegas, posted nationally on
25 intranet). Here, since the unlawful rules were published on a nationwide basis, it is necessary and
26 appropriate, in order for the remedy to be effective and meaningful, to order rescission on a
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1 nationwide basis. As such, the ALJ erred in failing to order the rules he found to be unlawful
2 completely rescinded from all locations in which they were originally published.

3 Moreover the ALJ's direction that the parties "explore modifications of the language" is
4 effectively a bargaining order. We do not challenge that order but find it strange.

5 **V. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE INCORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE**
6 **RULE REGARDING USE OF COMPUTER SYSTEMS IS NOT UNLAWFUL**

7 The Charging Party excepts to the ALJ's failure to find Respondent's handbook provision
8 21.4 "Use of Company Systems," unlawful, in light of the Acting General Counsel's position that
9 *Register Guard*, 351 NLRB 1110 (2007) should be overruled. Respondent's handbook provision
10 21.4, Use of Company Systems, prohibits use of company property, namely company systems,
11 equipment and resources, which includes the Respondent's email system, for purposes "of any
12 religious, political, or outside organizational activity." (See ALJ Decision, p. 19:2-32.) This
13 blanket prohibition unduly restricts union and protected concerted activities and must, therefore,
14 be found unlawful and ordered rescinded.

15 Under *Register Guard*, employer bans on personal use of its property are apparently
16 lawful as long as the employer does not discriminate against Section 7 activity. *Register Guard*,
17 531 NLRB 1110. However, the Acting General Counsel's position is that if an employer bans
18 use of its property to support *all* outside organizations, it violates Section 8(a)(1) of the act
19 because it reasonably tends to interfere with employees' right to engage in Section 7 activity.
20 Under *Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB*, 324 U.S. 793, 802 n. 10 (1945), employees
21 presumptively have a statutory right to use their employer's communications systems, subject to
22 their employer's need to maintain production and discipline. Therefore, a rule that bans
23 employees' personal use of such company equipment without a showing of special circumstances
24 interferes with employees' Section 7 communication at work and is unlawful.

25 Respondent's handbook rule, 2.4 Use of Company Systems, is overbroad and unlawful
26 under the *Republic Aviation* standard. The rule prohibits employee personal use of its equipment
27 in support of any outside organization. It goes further and prohibits "personal use of company
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1 property.” Employees would most reasonably view the ban on using company communications
2 equipment to support “any...outside organization activity,” as including unions, and, therefore,
3 clearly interferes with employees’ rights to organize. Because no exception is made or can be
4 inferred from the language of the rule, Respondent’s maintenance of this rule violates Section
5 8(a)(1) of the Act and the ALJ’s finding to the contrary is erroneous. Charging Party joins in the
6 Exception of the Acting General Counsel on this point.

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8 **VI. THE RULES ARE INVALID TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY PROHIBIT THE**
9 **EMPLOYEES FROM DISCLOSING COMPANY BUSINESS FOR PURPOSES OF**
10 **BOYCOTTING AND OTHER LAWFUL CONCERTED ACTIVITY**

11 The rules would prohibit individuals who work for the Company from disclosing
12 company business for purposes of engaging in consumer boycotts. Employees are entitled to
13 disclose upcoming sales, weaknesses in the business and other information which may allow a
14 Union or the workers themselves to engage in lawful boycotting. Indeed they could disclose
15 names of customers from whom a Union could seek support. The employer may have a right to
16 forbid disclosure to competitors but it doesn’t have a right to forbid the employees from
17 disclosing information that may be useful for effective boycotting, picketing or strike activity.
18 For example, employees have the right to disclose when a strike would be effective based on
19 business conditions. They have the right to disclose this information in order to avoid a defensive
20 lockout or even worse the hiring of scabs. A well timed job action based upon economic factors is
21 the essence of section 7 activity. Avoiding the right of employers to hire scabs or lockout is
22 equally justified. Unions and workers chose when to boycott and take economic action based
23 upon information about an employer’s business. The enforcement or maintenance of this
24 provision cripples the union and gives the employer an unfair advantage as to when to time a
25 lockout or other economic action. This language plainly prohibits disclosure of information which
26 goes to the heart of effective economic action and is overbroad for this reason.

1 **VII. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S REMEDY SHOULD BE MODIFIED IN**
2 **VARIOUS OTHER RESPECTS**

3 1. Here, since the unlawful rules were published on a nationwide basis, it is necessary
4 and appropriate, in order for the remedy to be effective and meaningful, to order rescission on a
5 nationwide basis. As such, the ALJ erred in failing to order the rules he found to be unlawful
6 completely rescinded from all locations in which they were originally published.

7 2 The Notice should be posted for the same length of time between the time the
8 unfair labor practices were first committed and the time the employer complies. It is time the
9 Board impose an effective notice requirement that discourages respondents from delaying
10 proceedings. The longer the proceedings are delayed the more likely those employees who are
11 adversely effective will never see the Notice. Its value decreases with delay. As a result, in order
12 to insure proper and meaningful posting, the Notice should be posted for the same length of time
13 between when the first unfair labor practice is committed and when the employer begins
14 compliance by posting the Notice.

15 In the alternative, the Board should require the Notice be posted for at least six months.

16 3. The Notice should be distributed to customers who should be aware of the
17 unlawful conduct of the Respondent.

18 4. The Notice should be posted nationwide and wherever in the world the employer
19 does business. It may have US employees in other facilities and they should be made aware of
20 this unlawful conduct.

21 5 The Notice should delete the reference to “refrain” since this is not an issue of the
22 disability imposed on workers of the ability to refrain from section 7 activity.

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VIII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons suggested above, these Cross Exceptions should be granted. Otherwise the Decision should be affirmed.

Dated: February 13, 2012

WEINBERG, ROGER & ROSENFELD
A Professional Corporation

By: _____/s/_____
DAVID A. ROSENFELD
Attorneys for Union/Charging Party

126468/655711

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2 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**
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4 I am a citizen of the United States and an employee in the County of Alameda, State of
5 California. I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the withing action; my business
6 address is 1001 Marina Village Parkway, Suite 200, Alameda, California 94501. I certify that on,
7 February 13, 2012 the was served on all parties or their counsel of record as listed below.
8

9 **Served Via Email**

10 Gregory D. Wolflick
11 Wolflick & Simpson
12 130 North Brand Blvd., Suite 410
13 Glendale, CA 91203

14 Email: greg@wolfsim.com

Served Via E-Filing

Chief Administrative Law Judge
National Labor Relations
Division of Judges
www.nlr.gov

15 I certify under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct.

16 Executed at Alameda, California, on February 13, 2012

17 /s/
18 _____
19 Marveline Carrell
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